The Inspectorate of Government (IG) has been under criticism in various news articles which I believe are partly due to a failure to understand the mandate of the institution.
This calls for efforts to help the public understand the intricacies involved in implementing the constitutional mandate of the inspectorate.
In his article in The Observer of April 19, ‘UDBL: How the bad guys derailed the IGG’, Pius Muteekani Katunzi implies that the IG is used by some individuals to fight personal battles as well as run away from the operation of the law, on the pretext of being whistle-blowers.
In his appearance on a TV talk-show on NTV, Andrew Mwenda called for the disbanding of the IG because he was dissatisfied with findings and recommendations in the report on alleged mismanagement and corruption at NSSF, based on a whistle-blower’s complaint.
In a subsequent article in the Independent of May 9-15, ‘Holding the IGG to account…’ Mwenda reiterates the message.
The Whistleblowers Protection Act of 2010 provides for the procedures by which individuals may disclose information that relates to irregular, illegal or corrupt practices and the protection against victimisation of such persons. The act defines a “whistle-blower” as a person, who makes a disclosure of impropriety to the IG, Uganda Police and the DPP, among others. Section 9 (1) prohibits victimisation of such persons.
In fulfilling its mandate to fight corruption and promote the rule of law, IG relies heavily on whistle-blowers. Complaints are assessed to ascertain whether they fall within the jurisdiction of the inspectorate. Where complaints are received from whistle-blowers, the inspectorate has an obligation to protect them.
In 2011, the IGG called for the suspension of the Board of Micro Finance Support Centre (MFSCL) for victimising whistle-blowers about misappropriation of funds at MFSCL. The case against Ms Patricia Ojangole, the CEO of Uganda Development Bank Ltd (UDBL), is, therefore, not the first of its kind, though she seems to be the first prosecuted by IG.
In his article, Katunzi also implies that the IG refused to investigate a complaint about the loss of Shs 54bn or Shs 22bn in UDBL and, instead, chose to investigate trivial matters such as victimising whistle-blowers. However, the loss of UDBL funds was reported to CIID by Dr Samuel Sejjaaka, board chairman, in September 2012 and not to IG. The CIID is investigating the matter.
In addition, the forensic audit referred to by Katunzi, which confirmed the loss of Shs 54bn or Shs 22bn in UDBL, was released in March 2013, not 2012. By that time, the IG had already commenced investigations into complaints related to the dismissal of staff and alleged irregular/illegal loan offer of $11.5m, lodged in December 2012 and January 2013. The IG is yet to issue a report about these complaints but its preparation is in its final stages. The IGG, therefore, could not be “derailed” from considering matters that the IG was not investigating.
In his ‘Holding the IGG to account’ article, Mwenda infers that the current IGG does not have “a strategic mind” and needs to understand the political economy of Uganda’s corruption complaints. Further that the broad powers of the IG create opportunities for staff members of IG to extort bribes from the accused. He advises the IGG to learn to refer most complaints filed to disciplinary committees, audit committees or boards.
The IG receives about 1,000 new complaints annually and a significant number is referred to other institutions. In 2013 for instance, 2,876 complaints were received by IG and 327 of them were referred to other institutions. The IG accounts to Parliament and to the president, in reports that are published twice every year.
The fact that some staff members of the IG extort or attempt to extort bribes from persons investigated is not lost on the IGG. In the recently concluded NSSF investigation, a staff member was arrested for that with the help of some of those investigated. Prosecution of the culprits, who include a former member of staff and a politician, are underway.
In another article, Independent, May 16-22, ‘NSSF management crisis’, Mwenda, categorises the findings of the IGG in the NSSF report. In his view, the improper sale of Namirembe land and inconsiderate use of a telephone were “minor” and investigations a waste of government funds because IG did not find evidence to prosecute for corruption. Mwenda seems to imply that the end justifies the means.
Notwithstanding my observations above, the common factors linking Katunzi and Mwenda’s views are the absence of clarity about the role of the IG in the governance framework in Uganda and the resultant criticism of the IG’s use of whistle-blowers who are alleged to use the IG for “settling personal vendettas.”
The IG derives its mandate and powers from Article 225 (1), special powers from Article 230 of the Constitution of Uganda, amplified by section 8 of the Inspectorate of Government Act. The remit of the IGG is, therefore, threefold: (i) to be the national ombudsman (ii) to head the anti-corruption agency, and (iii) to head the institution enforcing good conduct and integrity of leaders in public offices under the Leadership Code Act; a very broad mandate.
However, focus has often been given to anti-corruption work and most Ugandans, like Mwenda, understand IG as an agency that investigates and prosecutes the corrupt. Unfortunately, the ombudsman, anti-corruption agency and ethics agency are all rolled into one institution. The IGG, therefore, wears three hats; while sitting at the same desk, she/he has to keep doffing one hat and donning the other; the result of actions and decisions taken is often confusing to observers.
The author is the Inspector General of Government.